Transatlantic Politics

If  you read the declaration signed by the EU leaders to celebrate EU’s 50 anniversary, the "consensus" reached says a lot about the commitment for Europe to move forward. It’s a political statement that sounds pretty but remains very vague, trying to please everyone and therefore not committing itself to anything. The word "enlargement" doesn’t even come up, although it’s been the most successful EU policy so far. Sure, they talk about reunification and integration, but enlargement implies a strategy with political AND economic aims. And that seems to be forgotten.

Europe’s wealth lies in the knowledge and ability of its people; that is the key to growth, employment and social cohesion. We will fight terrorism and organized crime together.

We stand up for liberties and civil rights also in the struggle against those who oppose them. Racism and xenophobia must never again be given any rein.

We are committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the world and to ensuring that people do not become victims of war, terrorism and violence.

The European Union wants to promote freedom and development in the world. We want to drive back poverty, hunger and disease. We want to continue to take a leading role in that fight.

We intend jointly to lead the way in energy policy and climate protection and make our contribution to averting the global threat of climate change.

The Economist published this week a very realistic analysis about how the EU and the US are completely losing their leverage and power to attract former Soviet countries to commit to democracy and transatlantic values. The so-called "orange era" is coming to an end, the revolutionary spirit that sparked across Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia or  Kyrgyzstan, but one could argue also about Romania, Bulgaria or Hungary.

The bottled-up anger with the petty humiliations of daily life that fuelled past protest movements in ex-communist countries has weakened, partly because life has improved and partly because of the opportunities offered by migration. The EU—to put it mildly—no longer looks like a lighthouse beckoning new members towards peace and prosperity. As Mr Krastev says, the clearer the EU’s borders become, the less attractive it is to outsiders, and the weaker its promise that “if you are like us, you could become one of us”.

Plus, there is serious competition. Russia has learned the importance of the people-power game, and is going to play it with increasing skill. The Kremlin looks set to invest more money, more time and more expertise in winning over wobbly post-Soviet countries than the West ever will. It can call now on sinister pro-Putin groups, such as Nashi (Ours), which know how to mobilise a crowd. If you applaud orange-clad activists making history on the streets of Kiev, it is hard to explain why those trying to do the same in the Kremlin’s red white and blue are inherently more objectionable.

The conclusion of the b-day declaration, "Europe is our common future" - a sort of a milder "United we stand" - might be a good PR-thing, but it’s hardly a reality among the EU members. And this is known and exploited by Russia. The losers seem to be always the same - the satellite and former Soviet countries, especially those who tried to commit themselves to Euroatlanticism. But looking at the way the EU works and acts right now, they might consider this was a big mistake.

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