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	<title>Comments on: In Bosnia, the EU goes too soft, too soon</title>
	<link>http://www.transatlanticpolitics.com/2007/04/17/47/</link>
	<description>A fresh look at the thorns between the USA and the EU</description>
	<pubDate>Sat, 22 Nov 2008 00:52:49 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: A Canadian</title>
		<link>http://www.transatlanticpolitics.com/2007/04/17/47/#comment-16</link>
		<dc:creator>A Canadian</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Apr 2007 18:38:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.transatlanticpolitics.com/2007/04/17/47/#comment-16</guid>
		<description>When discussing the prospects of democracy in Bosnia, one must consider why elections were included in the peace settlement signed at Dayton in 1995. 
        In fact, there was never debate whether or not elections would occur in BiH and had been assumed in all previous peace plans. What was fought for fiercely in negotiations was the format and timing of the expected elections. Indeed, Milosevic sought elections hoping to oust the difficult Bosnian Serb leaders, expecting Bosnian Serb refugees in Belgrade (equipped with a vote) could be convinced to elect a Bosnian Serb leadership willing to toe the Serbian line. Izetbegovic also saw an instrumental use for democracy, and pushed hard for refugees to be allowed to vote in their 1991 census locations. He envisioned democracy largely within the context of ethnic voting blocks, and assumed that the Muslim majority would give the Bosniak government more legitimate claim to more land. 
       With the Croats satiated by progress on Eastern Slavonia, the debate over elections à€“ and the shape of democracy à€“ was primarily between the Serb and Bosniak negotiators. It is telling of the prospects for democracy in Bosnia that elections were implemented with an expectation by either side that electoral democracy was to be a continuation of war by other means.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When discussing the prospects of democracy in Bosnia, one must consider why elections were included in the peace settlement signed at Dayton in 1995.<br />
        In fact, there was never debate whether or not elections would occur in BiH and had been assumed in all previous peace plans. What was fought for fiercely in negotiations was the format and timing of the expected elections. Indeed, Milosevic sought elections hoping to oust the difficult Bosnian Serb leaders, expecting Bosnian Serb refugees in Belgrade (equipped with a vote) could be convinced to elect a Bosnian Serb leadership willing to toe the Serbian line. Izetbegovic also saw an instrumental use for democracy, and pushed hard for refugees to be allowed to vote in their 1991 census locations. He envisioned democracy largely within the context of ethnic voting blocks, and assumed that the Muslim majority would give the Bosniak government more legitimate claim to more land.<br />
       With the Croats satiated by progress on Eastern Slavonia, the debate over elections à€“ and the shape of democracy à€“ was primarily between the Serb and Bosniak negotiators. It is telling of the prospects for democracy in Bosnia that elections were implemented with an expectation by either side that electoral democracy was to be a continuation of war by other means.</p>
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		<title>By: Volboy</title>
		<link>http://www.transatlanticpolitics.com/2007/04/17/47/#comment-15</link>
		<dc:creator>Volboy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Apr 2007 12:19:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.transatlanticpolitics.com/2007/04/17/47/#comment-15</guid>
		<description>In addition to your point about democracy not appearing with the wave of a magic wand, one might also consider Afghanistan.  After less than one year in command even NATO is having difficulty getting more troop commitments from member countries, with the exception of Australia.

Good post though.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In addition to your point about democracy not appearing with the wave of a magic wand, one might also consider Afghanistan.  After less than one year in command even NATO is having difficulty getting more troop commitments from member countries, with the exception of Australia.</p>
<p>Good post though.</p>
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		<title>By: The Quiet American</title>
		<link>http://www.transatlanticpolitics.com/2007/04/17/47/#comment-11</link>
		<dc:creator>The Quiet American</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Apr 2007 14:44:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.transatlanticpolitics.com/2007/04/17/47/#comment-11</guid>
		<description>I think Jerry is correct that Bosnia will not be able to develop as a truly multi-ethnic state -- one border crossing between Bosnia and Srpska was enough to convince me of that. 

Partition certainly has its benefits and may be inevitable. For better or worse, we are going to see a worldwide trend of states breaking apart into nation-states over the next several decade (A point more thoroughly explored in Kaplan's 'The Coming Anarchy').

But we have to be extremely careful how we allow the process of partition to unfold. Despite the official administrative division of Bosnia, many areas are ethnically diverse. Dividing the country could spur mass migration and possibly incite conflict. We only have to look at the 1947 partition of India, which resulted in 500,000 to 1,000,000 deaths, to see how devastating dividing territories can be. 

If Bosnia is to be partitioned, we will need a much higher level of international involvement/intervention. That, of course, is not happening. Instead, the EU is running for the door.

P.S. I'll give my two cents on the radical Muslim threat in an upcoming post.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think Jerry is correct that Bosnia will not be able to develop as a truly multi-ethnic state &#8212; one border crossing between Bosnia and Srpska was enough to convince me of that. </p>
<p>Partition certainly has its benefits and may be inevitable. For better or worse, we are going to see a worldwide trend of states breaking apart into nation-states over the next several decade (A point more thoroughly explored in Kaplan&#8217;s &#8216;The Coming Anarchy&#8217;).</p>
<p>But we have to be extremely careful how we allow the process of partition to unfold. Despite the official administrative division of Bosnia, many areas are ethnically diverse. Dividing the country could spur mass migration and possibly incite conflict. We only have to look at the 1947 partition of India, which resulted in 500,000 to 1,000,000 deaths, to see how devastating dividing territories can be. </p>
<p>If Bosnia is to be partitioned, we will need a much higher level of international involvement/intervention. That, of course, is not happening. Instead, the EU is running for the door.</p>
<p>P.S. I&#8217;ll give my two cents on the radical Muslim threat in an upcoming post.</p>
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		<title>By: jerry</title>
		<link>http://www.transatlanticpolitics.com/2007/04/17/47/#comment-10</link>
		<dc:creator>jerry</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Apr 2007 13:17:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.transatlanticpolitics.com/2007/04/17/47/#comment-10</guid>
		<description>The solution for the problems in Bosnia remains the same today as it was in the mid-1990s, i.e.,   partition and unification of the predominantly Serb and Croat regions with their respective countries.  One of the foreseeable yet unseen consequences of granting Independence for Kosovo on the basis of national self-determination is renewed agitation by the Bosnian Serb and Croat populations for equal treatment.  Bosnia will never be a multi-ethnic state and violence and the potential for civil war will remain just below the surface.  You cannot create a national identity by fiat.  The irony of the entire conflict is that Serbia remains the only multi-ethnic society in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

As far the so-called moderate Muslims of Bosnia goes they will become far less moderate if and when constraints on their behavior disappear.  IzetbegoviÄ? was far less moderate in his writings then the face that he put on for the western world.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The solution for the problems in Bosnia remains the same today as it was in the mid-1990s, i.e.,   partition and unification of the predominantly Serb and Croat regions with their respective countries.  One of the foreseeable yet unseen consequences of granting Independence for Kosovo on the basis of national self-determination is renewed agitation by the Bosnian Serb and Croat populations for equal treatment.  Bosnia will never be a multi-ethnic state and violence and the potential for civil war will remain just below the surface.  You cannot create a national identity by fiat.  The irony of the entire conflict is that Serbia remains the only multi-ethnic society in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.</p>
<p>As far the so-called moderate Muslims of Bosnia goes they will become far less moderate if and when constraints on their behavior disappear.  IzetbegoviÄ? was far less moderate in his writings then the face that he put on for the western world.</p>
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