Creepy words from Vladimir Putin at the Black Sea Economic Cooperation summit in Istanbul that sound eerily familiar to Eastern Europeans of the "old days" of Soviet occupation:
"The Balkans and the Black Sea have always been a sphere of our special interests. And it is but natural that a resurgent Russia is returning here."
The last move that practically checkmates the timid EU strategy in lowering its dependency on Russia was made last Saturday, when the Italian company ENI signed a memorandum with Gazprom to build a pipeline through the Black Sea, thus undermining the Nabucco-project that would have crossed Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria - bringing gas from the Caspian region and maybe Iran to the Western markets. Here is what the Moscow Times reports:
Gazprom and Italian oil firm Eni unveiled a plan Saturday for a big new pipeline to take Russian gas under the Black Sea to Europe, undermining an earlier plan to extend a Turkish route. The 900-kilometer South Stream pipeline would come ashore in Bulgaria and then branch to Austria and Slovenia in one spur and southern Italy in another, Eni CEO Paolo Scaroni said at a news conference with Gazprom deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev and the two countries industry ministers.
Austria, of course, is well off, after having signed a deal with Gazprom on building joint storage facilities at Baumgarten, the regional hub where the Nabucco pipeline would have ended. (See also: Russia: If we can't own the pipeline, we'll control the faucet) Coincidentally or not, the South Stream pipeline has a branch to Austria..
While the Russian monopoly has succeeded in cutting out British Petroleum of the Siberian gas fields, both the EU and US lack leadership in respect to the Black Sea and Caspian region. As Vladimir Socor puts it, the US and EU energy policies in Eurasia are collapsing:
In retrospect, Washington's retreat from leadership on Central Asia-Europe energy transit projects in 2001-2005, along with a policy vacuum in Brussels, set the stage for the debacle just seen. Even after the January 2006 "wake-up call" (triggered by Kremlin manipulations with Turkmen gas supplies to Ukraine and beyond), the U.S. and EU relegated Caspian energy policy mainly to mid-level officialdom, with only episodic top-level involvement.
In Washington, for example, a deputy assistant secretary of state was tasked to promote these energy projects in the relevant countries, in a direct match against Putin. The Russian president (along with his energy executives) was personally interacting with the same countries and leaders to pull his incomparably greater political weight for the Russia-favored projects. The United States and the EU did not seriously attempt to offset Kremlin pressures on the Kazakh and Turkmen presidents. Nor did they develop timely and convincingly resourced alternatives to the ready-made Russian projects.
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Jun 26th, 2007


